Saturday, January 2, 2016

Is there anything worth buying yet?

If we do see a recovery in oil price in the short term, there are LOTS of oil stocks that can go up by several hundred percent.  And one thing I have grappled with in my mind, is whether I am being overly pessimistic.  Even if oil prices will probably stay low, if (to use entirely hypothetical numbers) there is a 30% chance that they could recover to $60 by june, then it may be worth buying stocks that would go up by 300% under that scenario, even if they might go to zero under another scenario.  We may be reaching the point of maximum pessimism.  In not buying, I accept that i am likely to miss the bottom, but I am waiting for some sort of concrete sign that oil prices are likely to stabilize.

Below are my views on the various equity segments.  I haven't been spending any time on this really so I would caution that these are impressions as opposed to any sort of deep analysis:

1) E&Ps- LOTS of them will most likely go bankrupt, and they are generally carrying too much debt to be attractive as acquisition targets.  They are running out of rope for several reasons.  Their scope for further cost reductions and efficiency gains is probably limited.  Their hedging programs, which have hugely helped them in the past year, will provide less and less benefit as they run out.  The inventory of uncompleted wells have provided cash flow as they reduce capex and kept production level.  At some point these will run out, and production rates will start to decrease.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, with debt trading at distressed levels, they will have trouble rolling it over, and at the very least will have to accept much higher interest costs as they issue new debt to roll over the old.  A huge number of companies would eventually go bankrupt if oil prices stay at this level.

2) Integrated Companies- Exxon, Shell, Total, Chevron.  These guys have been shielded by the declines in several ways.  Refining margins and chemicals have been terrific in North America, but with the end of the export ban, and regional differentials the lowest they've been in years, many of the drivers of North American refining profits are abating.  they still have low cost natural gas to give them a cost advantage vs Asian and European refiners, but its hard to see how profits in refining don't come down.  Secondly in the upstream sector, the nature of production sharing contracts (typical for oil majors operating overseas) is such that capex gets paid off before the government starts taking their lion's share of the profits, this insulates risk for the majors.  So while the price declines can make a north american tight-oil well a big money-loser, large overseas projects won't necessarily be hemorrhaging money for the majors since the capex costs will still be recovered.  But the majors' core expertise has become doing high cost technically complex projects, often offshore.  These projects simply don't make sense going forward, unless we see a significant price increase.  Its unclear how they will replace declining production, unless they can buy shale assets in bankruptcy, as the E&Ps go bust.  I'm not sure that Exxon trading 20% off its peak levels, and 20x 2015 earnings, truly reflects their change in circumstances since $100/bbl oil.  The big dividend  yields of the European companies like Shell are tempting, but these are payout ratios of well over 100% at this point, and not at all sustainable.  All of these companies are pricing in a significantly higher oil price, a dangerous situation for investors.

3) Offshore drillers- These were always a bit of a suspect business to me.  In the good times, people order new-builds.  In the bad times, all but the newest drill-ships become almost worthless.  And after decades of deepwater experience costs are still very high.  Meanwhile on-shore tight oil costs have come down dramatically in just 6 or 7 short years.  Capex budgets for onshore can be rapidly cut, while offshore they have to plan for many years into the future.  A bad accident offshore can result in a $50b charge (see BP Horizon spill) unlike onshore drilling.  I'm not saying that offshore drilling will die entirely, but it would not be surprising to me if we see an excess supply of rigs for a decade or more in the future, and essentially no new builds.

4) Refining- High North American refining margins were supported by large regional differentials.  These differentials were caused by rapid production growth in certain regions like North Dakota and West Texas.  With supply declining, logistical constrains will ease.  Already the famous WTI-Brent spread, which first blew out in 2010, has now collapsed.  Its hard to see how refining margins don't contract significantly, but I must admit this is not an area that I know a ton about.

5) Pipelines- 2015 was a horrendous year for pipelines and MLPs.  Kinder Morgan, the poster child for MLP related financial engineering, has crashed from a peak of $44 down to $14.   MLPs were billed as being insulated from price changes, but that apparently was not the case.  I wonder if this crash has now been overdone.  I really don't feel qualified to make a recommendation here without doing some extensive work.


Checking in. A look at the supply-demand balance over the past year.

I have not bought any energy stocks since last writing here.  The world has remained grossly oversupplied, to the tune of about 1 million barrels per day.  World inventories are at their highest level in history.  Demand grew at 1.9% (1.8 million barrels per day) for 2015 vs 2014 of which 1.1 million barrels per day of growth was in the Asia/Pacific region.  The remainder of .6 million per day demand growth was spread out fairly evenly across the world.


The biggest driver of Asian growth was China.  Motor gasoline demand grew at .2 million barrels per day as auto sales reached an annual rate of 16.5 million vehicles, or similar to the US rate of sales.  The key difference is that in the US new vehicles are largely replacing scrapped vehicles.  In China only about 1 million vehicles were scrapped in 2015, and the rate of growth for the in-use fleet of passenger vehicles was an incredible 20% annually.    India products demand also grew at about .3 million barrels per day, another strong driver of the Asian demand growth.

 Supply demand balance from IEA December report.


On the supply side, after years of non-opec supply growth driven mainly by the US, non-opec supply growth slowed dramatically over the course of 2015.  US supply growth has finally reversed.   The oil rig count stands at 545 according to the december Baker Hughes report, down by about two thirds since peaking in late 2014. Russian growth, which has been a surprise, is also projected to stop next year by IEA.  Overall, former Soviet Union exports were roughly flat at about 9 million barrels per day.   By the end of the year non-opec supply was probably contracting.    


But this slack was taken up by strong opec supply growth.  Saudi Arabia has often been given the credit for OPECs all-out production, and they certainly are the most influential OPEC member, since they are the only ones who maintain significant spare capacity. But in fact the Saudis have not added much to the glut, since their own increases in supply have largely been soaked up by increasing domestic demand.  Total exports have hovered around 8 million barrels per day of crude and products since 2012.  Iraq, on the other hand has gone from exporting around 2 to 2.5 mbd in early 2014, to exporting about 4 mbd in late 2015.  Iraq remains a potential source of increased supply in the long term, but a stretched budget, political instability, and lack of investment suggest that further production growth may be some years off.  Libya and Iran are the two most likely growers in 2016.  Libya is producing at less than .5 mbd, compared to their levels of 1.7 mbd before Gadhafi’s ouster.  There are some indications that the fighting there may stop. Iran has lots of spare capacity ready to come online if sanctions end.  Both areas are also affected by chronic underinvestment, and good grow supply over the longer term under the right conditions.




IEA projects continued oversupply until late 2016.  Overall, I think there are a lot of reasons to continue to be pessimistic. In the near term, we can expect a contraction of supply in the US, but this may well be offset by continued OPEC growth driven by Libya and Iran in the short term.  In the longer term (3-5 year), these low oil prices will reduce production in expensive deepwater areas like Gulf of Mexico, Canadian Oil Sands, North Sea, Offshore West Africa etc.  It will also reduce exploration budgets, which will reduce very long term supply.  Demand will continue to grow in the short term, driven by Asia.  But in the longer term, unlimited demand growth is not a given.  It is still very hard to say what the equilibrium price would be.  Given that US tight oil can work fairly well at $50-60/bbl, I would view this as the upper end of the likely price range over the next few years. 

Key points:

  1. The world is still oversupplied, although the 1 million barrels per day of oversupply is easing.  There is a good chance supply and demand will be in balance at the end of the year (but with unprecedented high inventory levels).
  2. Large capex budget cuts will lead to significant declines in US on-shore volumes next year, and will result in longer term declines (or at least will prevent growth) in other high-cost areas like Canadian oil sands and deepwater gulf of mexico, north sea, Brazil, West Africa, etc.
  3. There is still a risk for another big leg down in oil price.  One obvious scenario would be Iran exports coming back online with a vengeance.  Another, perhaps less likely, would be running up against physical limitations for storage, a scenario put forward by the Venezuelan oil minister.